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The use of the unitary tax method by various states in the United
States has engendered increasing controversy in the past few years. This
method of taxation has its origins in efforts by state taxing authorities to
tax the full income of corporations doing business both within and
outside the state.'
Congress has failed to enact legislation that effectively limits the
states' authority to tax income of corporations resident or doing business
within their territories. Nor has the Supreme Court successfully articu-
lated meaningful delineations of the scope of state taxing authority. As a
result, the states have been given free rein to operate in this area, often
giving rise to difficult jurisdictional problems. Traditionally, states have
sought to tax the out-of-state income (both U.S. and foreign) of corpora-
tions domiciled within their boundaries by considering only the income of
the corporation's subsidiaries located in the state. The more recent target
of taxation has been not only these subsidiary companies, but also the
foreign parent companies of these domiciled subsidiaries. Such activities
come under the category of unitary taxation.
Three constitutional issues are raised by the practice of the unitary
taxation method. First, the fourteenth amendment due process clause2 re-
quires that strictly lawful procedures be followed by the states. Second,
the interstate commerce clause' embodies the national interest in assur-
ing that excessive state taxation does not impede the free flow of com-
merce among the states. Both of these issues attend any situation where
the income of a multijurisdictional corporation is taxed, regardless of
whether the taxing state attempts to reach beyond United States borders.
When a state does seek to tax income outside U.S. borders, however, the
t This article does not reflect the Reagan Administration's recent announcement to
preempt state unitary tax legislation. However, the relevance of Professor Baker's analysis
remains unchanged. (Eds.)
* Associate Professor of International Business Law, University of Texas at Austin;
B.B.A. 1968, University of Miami; J.D. 1974, Southern Methodist University.
1. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multi jurisdictional Corporations: Reflections
on Mobil, Exxon, and H. R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113, 126 nn. 74 & 75 (1980); See G.
ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 101 (2d ed. 1950).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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third constitutional issue surfaces under the foreign commerce clause": to
assure states do not infringe upon the authority of a nation to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. This article examines these constitutional
issues and reviews the recent responses of the U.S. Executive and Con-
gress to this issue.
I. WHAT IS UNITARY TAXATION?
The unitary method of taxation was a response to the increased com-
plexity of corporations conducting business activity in several jurisdic-
tions. It was created to assess the income of a functionally related enter-
prise (the "unitary business") operating in more than one state.5 Taxing
authorities found that it was especially difficult to assess the income at-
tributable to any given state, and other methods of taxation' failed to do
so accurately. Formula apportionment 7 provides a means of determining a
reasonable share of the total income of a multijurisdictional corporation
by imputing it to a single jurisdiction. A state first determines whether a
unitary business exists; if a business is a part of a unitary enterprise, the
state will apportion the total income of the unitary business between the
taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world, using a formula. The unitary
method of formula apportionment is employed by forty-five states and
the District of Columbia.8 The formulas vary,9 but the most widely
adopted formula is that used by California, which bases its assessment of
income on the proportion of the unitary business' total payroll, property,
and sales located within the State."0 This form of taxation has been con-
stitutionally upheld" and has been recognized by the twenty-three states




5. Smith, A Levy That Spans the Ocean, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1983 at 8, col. 4.
6. The other two means of taxing corporate income are separate accounting and specific
allocation. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 116. Specific allocation, which traces income to a
single source, is not widely used in the taxation of multijurisdictional corporations since
there is difficulty in ascertaining the specific source of income generated by such a corpora-
tion. Id. at 116-117. Under the separate accounting method, income attributed to a certain
geographic or functional area of the multijurisdictional enterprise is treated separately from
other parts of the enterprise. Id. at 117. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. The terms "unitary method" and "formula apportionment" are used
interchangeably.
8. Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent Supreme Court Treatment, 48
ALB. L. REV. 48 (1983).
9. Id.
10. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 117-18. "By averaging the ratios of the taxpayer's
property, payroll, and sales within a state to its property, payroll, and sales throughout the
business, the formula yields a fraction that can be applied to the taxpayer's net income to
determine the portion taxable by the state." Id. at 118.
11. See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123
(1931); Bass, Ratcliff & Bretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
12. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
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The unitary method of taxation is used to assess income not only of
operations within several of the United States, but also of business opera-
tions in other countries, resulting in the state taxing foreign corporations.
This result occurs either when the foreign parent corporation has a sub-
sidiary doing business in a state using the unitary method, or when a
parent company with foreign subsidiaries is itself a resident of the state,
dependent, of course, upon the existence of a unitary business relation-
ship between the parent and the subsidiary or affiliate. The unitary
method, when used to tax such an enterprise, is referred to as "worldwide
combined reporting."' 13 Ten states 4 now use the worldwide combined re-
porting method.
II. DUE PROCESS
A state may not tax value earned outside its territory absent some
connection between itself and the activity sought to be taxed. The due
process clause imposes two restrictions on states. First, some minimal
connection between the income-generating activity sought to be taxed
and the taxing state must be established. 15 The Supreme Court has in-
cluded in this requirement that part of the business take place within the
state 6 and that some bond of control or ownership must exist between
the state and remaining parts of the "unitary business."' 7 The second re-
quirement imposed by the due process clause is that the "out-of-state
activities of the purported 'unitary business' be related in some concrete
way to the in-state activities."'" In essence, this requirement mandates
the existence of a unitary business. 9 If there was doubt in anyone's mind
that apportionment of income required the presence of a unitary busi-
ness, that doubt was allayed by the Court's decision in ASARCO, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Commission.20 ASARCO is a New Jersey corporation
having its principle commercial headquarters in New York. Its primary
business in Idaho, the taxing state, is silver mining, though it also mines
other metals in other states. Idaho sought to tax the dividends, interest
13. Weissman, supra note 8, at 48 n. 2.
14. As of this writing the ten states that use worldwide reporting are Alaska, California,
Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon (although repeal of its
law will become effective January 1, 1986) and Utah. Massachusetts until recently used
worldwide combined reporting; however the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held
that the state tax commissioner lacks the authority to use this method in the absence of
regulations aprising taxpayers of the law. See Polaroid Corp. v. Comm'n of Revenue #53479,
1984. See also Sheppard, No Unitary Method in Massachusetts, 25 TAX NoTEs 1057 (1984).
15. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 121.
16. Container, 463 U.S. at 165; see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-445 (1940).
17. Container, 463 U.S. at 166; see also ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307, 327-328 (1982).
18. Container, 463 U.S. at 174-5.
19. See generally ASARCO, 458 U.S. 307 and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax'n and Reve-
nue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
20. ASARCO, 458 U.S. 307.
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income, and capital gains of ASARCO's five foreign subsidiaries. The
Court held that intangible income, such as the dividends, interest, and
capital gains realized by a corporate taxpayer from investments in affili-
ated corporations, will be apportionable income only if a unitary business
relationship exists between the corporation whose securities generate the
income and the corporation receiving the income.2 1 Two earlier Supreme
Court cases, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont and
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,2 can be distin-
guished because the corporations in those cases operated unitary busi-
nesses, whereas ASARCO proved that the essential factors which evi-
dence the existence of a unitary business were wholly absent.
23
In ASARCO, the Court "assumed that the position of Idaho [was]
that a unitary business relationship between ASARCO and the dividend
paying companies is a necessary prerequisite to its taxation of the income
in question, but that the unitary business concept should be expanded to
cover the facts of the ASARCO case."2 The amicus curiae brief of the
Multistate Tax Commission, 2s however, espoused a theory that, had this
position been adopted by the Court, would have broadened the concept of
the unitary method dramatically. The view set forth in the brief was that
"there can exist a relationship between stock investments and the busi-
ness of the owner of the investments which is sufficient alone to justify
the apportionment of any income from the investments.. 2 The Court did
not address this theory, and its holding that a unitary business relation-
ship is required would seem to preclude any possibility that anything less
than that would suffice. The ruling in ASARCO left open hope for mul-
tinational corporations. First, it held that the dividends, interest income,
and capital gains of foreign subsidiaries would not, under these circum-
stances, form a portion of the tax base of a corporation. The decision was
significant if for no other reason than it was the first time in fifty years
that an income taxpayer had successfully shown a due process violation
with regard to the elements of nexus and rational relationship. 27 More-
21. Id. at 329-330. See Peters, Supreme Court Requires Unitary Relationship before
States Can Tax Investment Income, 57 J. TAX'N 314 (1982). Query: would it be different if
the income at issue were operating income? The Court didn't differentiate in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), nor in Exxon, 447 U.S. 207.
22. Mobil, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon, 447 U.S. 207.
23. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 320-324.
24. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
25. The Multistate Tax Commission is the "administrative agency of the Multistate
Tax Compact, whose purposes include the promotion of accuracy, equity, uniformity and
convenience in the state tax treatment of multistate and multinational businesses. There are
nineteen member states and ten associate member states of the Compact." Hellerstein,
supra note 1, at 114 n. 6. The constitutionality of the Compact was sustained in U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
26. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
27. The last time the Court had found such an argument persuasive was in Hans Rees,
283 U.S. at 134-135. Unsuccessful attempts included Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267 (1978); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Caro-
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over, multinationals could still hope at this point that the Court would
find unconstitutional state taxation on a worldwide basis.28 It should be
noted, however, that Idaho conceded that ASARCO was not a unitary
business, a fact that substantially weakens the impact of the decision in
favor of the corporation.
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of the State of Cali-
fornia2" illustrates that the significance of the determination of whether a
business will be classified as a unitary business cannot be underestimated,
for it is this determination that will decide the method of taxation that
will be used. The requirement that a unitary business exist before world-
wide combination reporting is used is susceptible to a great many more
qualifications and much more complexity than that of the first require-
ment of nexus.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme
Court decision in Butler Brothers v. McColgan,0 which set forth the sem-
inal definition of a unitary business. The California Supreme Court deter-
mined that a unitary business is one characterized by unity of ownership,
unity of use, and unity of management. 1 This definition has been criti-
cized as overbroad,32 and indeed, almost any multijurisdictional corpora-
tion could fit this description. The California court's further comments
indicate that each situation will have to be decided on its own facts and
whether those facts demonstrate interdependence.3 The Supreme Court,
in its decisions, has announced several distinguishing characteristics of
the unitary business beyond the three unities announced in Butler
Brothers.34
From its initial efforts to determine the scope of the unitary business,
the Court has said that the existence of a "vertical" enterprise suffices. 35
Vertical enterprises are those whose different components, such as drill-
lina ex rel Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936); Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365,
168 S.E. 397 (1933), aff'd per curiam, 291 U.S. 642 (1934). The Court did, however, invali-
date the District of Columbia's single-factor sales formula for apportioning corporate in-
come on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See General Motors Corp. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
28. ADvISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SPEcIAL REPORT-STATE
TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, March, 1983, reprinted in TAX NOTES, 995,
1001, (1983) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT].
29. 539 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
30. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
31. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 664, 111 P.2d 334, (1941).
32. Weissman, supra note 8, at 65. See also Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept
in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 47-48 (1960).
33. The court wrote, "[i]f the operation ... of the business done within the state is
dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the opera-
tions are unitary; otherwise, if there is no such dependency, the business within the state
may be considered to be separate." Edison California Stores v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 183
P.2d 16, 21 (1947).
34. 315 U.S. at 508.
35. See, e.g., Hans Rees, 283 U.S. 123; Underwood Typewriter 254 U.S. 113.
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ing, refining, and sales, are in different states. A strong argument can be
made for taxing such an operation because each component part does de-
rive from the taxing state some benefit that may justify a tax imposition.
This central operations criterion has been used to justify both taxing of
component parts in states of the United States 6 and in integrated busi-
nesses operating across national boundaries.
3 7
The principle was later extended to horizontal operations, which are
defined as a series of similar operations under common management, con-
trol, or both,3 8 or that share risks. Interrelations will exist between the
affiliated firms, but one is not the customer of the other. The Court has
recognized the problem of the practice of tax avoidance, whereby compa-
nies doing business in a state seek to dodge some of their tax burdens by
setting up apparently discrete entities elsewhere. The logic is more
strained here, however. Assuming that the rationale a state relies on to
tax income earned outside its borders is that some of the resources of that
state were used to generate the income, the argument is much weaker in
the case of an enterprise that is horizontally integrated. 9
In its recent cases, the Court appears to have retained its previous
distinction between vertically integrated businesses and those businesses
engaged in the same line of business. In Exxon, an oil company con-
ducting marketing activities in Wisconsin challenged that state's formula
apportionment which took into consideration all of its operating income,
arguing instead that the state should tax only the company's marketing
activities. Similarly, in Mobil, an oil company challenged Vermont's in-
clusion in its tax base income received by the company in the form of
dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates doing business abroad. In both
of these cases, the Court found the existence of a unitary business. The
continuous flow and interchange of common products between subsidiar-
ies and domestic corporations noted in Mobil and Exxon4 1 were sufficient
to constitute a unitary business relationship.
On the contrary, no unitary business was found to exist in
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico.
4 1
At issue in Woolworth, as in Mobil, were dividends of four foreign subsid-
iaries 42 of the F.W. Woolworth company, a corporation domiciled in New
York and operating a chain of retail stores throughout the United States.
36. Underwood Typewriter, 254 U.S. 113.
37. Bass, 266 U.S. 271.
38. See Butler Bros., 315 U.S. 501.
39. A possible rationale for permitting the use of the unitary method in this situation
might be derived from examination of the enterprise's "operational interdependence" which
would ascertain the degree of interdependance between subsidiaries controlled by a parent
corporation. See Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the
Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L. TAX J. 487, 501-503 (1968).
40. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
41. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
42. Woolworth owned all of the outstanding stock of three of the foreign subsidiaries
and approximately 53% of another. Id. at 362.
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The subsidiaries in question conducted retail sales similar to those oper-
ated by Woolworth in the United States. The Woolworth Court noted
a critical distinction between a retail merchandising business ... and
the type of multi-national business... in which refined, processed, or
manufactured products (or parts thereof) may be produced in one or
more countries and marketed in various countries, often worldwide. In
operations of this character, there is a flow of international trade,
often an interchange of personnel, and substantial mutual
interdependence.
43
The same kind of interaction and interdependence did not exist between
the corporation and the subsidiaries as existed in Mobil and Exxon. Simi-
larly, ASARCO's silver mining and its subsidiary's (Southern Peru) au-
tonomous business were found to be insufficiently connected to permit
the companies to be classified as a unitary business." The distinction be-
tween vertically integrated enterprises, which supply a stream of products
and services, and affiliated corporations may not be as cut and dried as it
first appeared, as evidenced by the Court's comment that Woolworth po-
tentially had authority to operate its subsidiaries as integrated divisions
of a single unitary business.4 5 It was unclear how Woolworth would be
able to conduct its business as an "integrated" rather than a "discrete"
business, since its subsidiaries were engaged in the same kind of busi-
ness-not providing raw materials to or purchasing products from
Woolworth.4 The statement suggests that under some circumstances, a
horizontal business might be considered to be a unitary enterprise.
Centralization of management and control occupied a lesser role in
ascertaining the existence of a unitary business in ASARCO and
Woolworth.4' The Court still looked into the "nature and extent of inter-
corporate sales, the actual exercise of control by ASARCO over the affili-
ated corporations, and the centralization of management services, "48 but
it failed to find a sufficient management or control linkage in ASARCO 49
43. Id. at 371 (footnote omitted). However, the Court did not decide Woolworth on the
grounds that it was not a vertically integrated business.
44. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
45. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 362.
46. 458 U.S. 354.
47. See Peters, supra note 21, at 318.
48. Id. at 314.
49. The Court recognized that there were some occasions when the corporations con-
ducted transactions with each other. There also were some centralized services as well as the
use of a patent for a fee. In short, the potential for ASARCO to exercise control over the
companies existed. However, the majority did not find compelling the factors the dissent
found persuasive; the dissent recognized a relationship between ASARCO's investment deci-
sion making and business conducted in the taxing state. It also emphasized the importance
of the investments on the business conducted by ASARCO in the taxing state and the busi-
ness advantages, such as stability, source of raw materials and outlet for products derived
from the investments.
The majority conducted a detailed analysis of only the one subsidiary that would be
most likely to be named a unitary business, Southern Peru. ASARCO owned 51.5% of
1985
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and Woolworth." The Court summarized the major relevant issue to be
whether contributions to the income of the subsidiaries or affiliates re-
sulted from the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state. Because the ex-
tent of managerial control did not rise to the level of creating a unitary
business, the state's attempts to tax the income in question were no more




An argument somewhat similar to the corporate form argument is
one that alleges that the constitutionality of a unitary tax will depend on
the accounting system. Exxon's challenge of the Wisconsin unitary tax
focused on both prongs of the due process test. Exxon argued that its
separate accounting is evidence that neither prong of the due process test
was satisfied.
52
The Supreme Court apparently adopted Wisconsin's argument that a
state is justified in applying its apportionment formula merely by virtue
of the existence of a unitary business within the state. Most striking,
though, was the definitive way in which the Court dispensed with the
issue of separate accounting. Exxon had argued that Wisconsin should
use separate accounting rather than apportionment and thereby include
income only from the marketing activities. After Exxon, however, a com-
pany's separate accounting for tax purposes will not be binding on a
state.53 Although a company may still use separate accounting to prove
Southern Peru's outstanding stock and received 35% of its copper output. The Court, how-
ever, found other aspects of the relationship controlling. Pursuant to a management con-
tract with Southern Peru, ASARCO could elect only 6 of the 13 directors, though a vote of 8
was necessary to pass any resolution. ASARCO was only one of Southern Peru's stockhold-
ers; a unanimous vote of all four was required to alter the articles or by-laws. Based on these
and other findings of the trial court, the Court found Southern Peru to be a discrete enter-
prise, operating independently of ASARCO and not otherwise controlled by ASARCO. The
majority rejected Idaho's argument that corporate purpose should define a unitary business.
458 U.S. at 362.
50. In Woolworth, the Court examined the three requisite elements of a unitary busi-
ness. See supra text accompanying note 31. First, the Court found "little functional integra-
tion" between the parent and the subsidiary. The subsidiaries were free to choose their own
store sites, advertising, accounting, legal purchasing, personnel, training, and financing. 458
U.S. at 364-365. Second, the Court found that management was not centralized and that
"each subsidiary operated as a distinct business enterprise." Id. at 366. Finally, the Court
observed, that economies of scale were intentionally ignored. Id. at 366-368. Support for the
last two elements-centralized management and economies of scale-was evidenced by sep-
arate offices (with one exception), and the absence of exchange of personnel, central mer-
chandise or management training, any central nonretailing policies or tax planning, depart-
ment or section devoted to overseeing the foreign subsidiary operations, or formal
interchange of ideas between parent and subsidiary management. Id.
The Court did not find pervasive the presence of several common directors, frequent
informed communications, or that major financial decisions by the subsidiaries required
parent approval. Also, the Court gave little weight to the fact that the parent and subsidiary
published unsolicited financial statements. 458 U.S. at 368-369.
51. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 328, quoting Bass, 266 U.S. 271, 283 (1924).
52. Exxon, 447 U.S. at 221.
53. Id.
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that certain income is unrelated to the business' activities,54 it cannot use
separate accounting to avoid a state's application of its apportionment
formula if a portion of the unitary business is found to exist within the
state.55
The type of income received by the corporation has no bearing on
whether a state will be allowed to tax. Only in Exxon was the taxable
income dispute over operating income. Operating income is clearly more
susceptible to taxation under the unitary principle, since that money
would be used to further the business, part of which has been established
to exist in the taxing state. In Mobil, however, the dispute concerned div-
idend income received by a nondomiciliary corporation. The Court's deci-
sion to allow taxation established that the due process clause does not
preclude inclusion of foreign source dividend income from subsidiaries
and affiliates in the apportionable tax base of a nondomiciliary corpora-
tion.5 Dividend income was also at issue in ASARCO and Woolworth,
and though the Court held these sums not taxable by the states, the deci-
sion was based on the absence of a unitary business relationship rather
than the type of income.
5 7
The analysis in Mobil shows that the corporate form of a business
enterprise will not be a decisive factor in determining the existence of a
unitary business. The Mobil Court stated:
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more at-
tractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form of business
organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or di-
versity of a business enterprise. Had appellant [Mobil] chosen to op-
erate its foreign subsidiaries as separate divisions of a legally as well
as functionally integrated enterprise, there is little doubt that the in-
come derived from those divisions would meet due process require-
ments for apportionability. . . Transforming the same income into
dividends from legally separate entities works no change in the under-
lying economic realities of a unitary business, and accordingly it ought
not to affect the apportionability of income the parent receives.58
Thus, the multicorporate form will not in and of itself shield income dis-
tributed as dividends from apportionment in the enterprise's tax base if a
unitary business is found to exist, "for the linchpin of apportionability in
the field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle." 59 The
54. In determining whether certain income will be taxed, the Court "looks to the 'un-
derlying economic realities of a unitary business,' and ... [if the income will be nontaxable,
it] must derive from 'unrelated business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business en-
terprise.'" Id. at 223-224 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439, 441-442).
55. Weissman, supra note 8, at 81. See also John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952); Butler Bros., 315
U.S. 501.
56. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 126.
57. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 330; Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 372.
58. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 440-441.
59. Id. at 439.
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taxpayer must show that underlying economic realities warrant the for-
mal and legal distinction between the separate corporate entities.60
Exxon and Mobil struck fear in the hearts of corporate executives;
the opinions reflected a continuation of judicial restraint from earlier
cases, but afforded no further delineation of the unitary business or re-
strictions imposed by the due process clause. The Court's unwillingness
to announce a single definition of a unitary business was equivalent to an
announcement that, absent congressional action, the states would con-
tinue to enjoy broad leeway in taxing a portion of a corporation's world-
wide income."1
With the decision of ASARCO and Woolworth came rekindled hope
that the Court, in the absence of repeatedly requested congressional ac-
tion, would limit the scope of the states' taxing power. Some thought this
would signal a return by the Court to a closer economic analysis of inter-
state and international tax issues. Further, in the absence of due process
restrictions, surely the Court would seize upon the commerce clause. The
Supreme Court's most recent opinion addressing the unitary taxation
method, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,62 corrected
these ill-placed hopes.
Container is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois whose
business activities involved the production and distribution of paper-
board and paperboard-based packaging.13 Container controlled twenty
foreign subsidiaries in Western Europe and Latin America during the
three-year period at issue, though Container and its subsidiaries were
highly decentralized.6"'
In its due process clause argument, Container focused on one of the
major inherent problems of formula apportionment, alleging that formula
apportionment was inaccurate due to differing wage and profit rates be-
tween the parent corporation and its foreign subsidiaries.65 Such an argu-
ment, however, had little chance of success after the Court's decision in
Mobil, 6 on which the Container court relied heavily. Because Container
was found to be carrying on a unitary business, "a state may apply an
apportionment formula to the taxpayer's total income to arrive at a rough
approximation of the corporate income attributable to activities within
the state."67 While neither formula is perfect, the Court found that sepa-
rate accounting results in no greater accuracy than formula apportion-
ment. Only gross miscalculations of taxes will warrant a state tax being
60. Id. at 440-441.
61. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 151.
62. 463 U.S. 159.
63. Container, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123 (1981).
64. Id.
65. See 463 U.S. at 174-5, where Container disclosed the amount of money required to
produce one dollar of net income during the years in question.
66. See supra text accompanying note 61.
67. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 1003, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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struck down, and here the Court found none that would merit such a
remedy."
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE & FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The use of the unitary method of taxation prompted complaints of
commerce clause violations from many corporations. The Supreme Court
had identified the major restraint imposed by the commerce clause to be
that a state tax may not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce
by subjecting a multijurisdictional enterprise to taxation not borne by a
single jurisdictional business. 9 Such a situation arises due to multiple
taxation.
The Supreme Court addressed the commerce clause restrictions on
implementing the unitary tax in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.70
Complete Auto added predictability to commerce clause challenges to
unitary taxes by establishing a four-part test. The unitary tax will be up-
held if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the tax-
ing State, if [it is] fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State. '"71
However, when a foreign corporation is taxed, internationally ac-
cepted standards establishing principles for taxation become involved.
Two important sets of rules for this purpose are: "(1) those defining a
permanent establishment, such as a branch or subsidiary corporation,
that can be taxed by the host country; and (2) those specifying the proce-
dures to be used to account for transactions between related parties in
measuring the income of a permanent establishment. 72 Under this sec-
ond set of rules, the branch or subsidiary is to be treated as a separate
entity. This is often called the "water's edge" or "arm's length" rule. It is
practiced by the federal government 73 and the Internal Revenue Service
68. The Court found that only a 14% discrepancy in taxable income allocable to Cali-
fornia resulted from application of the unitary tax as would have resulted from Container's
own separate accounting method. 463 U.S. at 174-5 nn. 11-12, 184. Although 14% seems not
to be an insignificant amount, the Court compared it to the situation in Hans Rees. North
Carolina's one-factor formula assessing taxable income on the basis of tangible property was
struck down after a finding that a 250% discrepancy in taxable income attributable to the
taxing entity resulted from the application of the formula method. 283 U.S. at 135. Hans
Rees imposes a theoretical limit on the permissible distortion resulting from formula appor-
tionment. It is unlikely, however, that a taxpayer will be able to make the requisite showing
that "there is no rational relationship between the income attributed to the state and the
intrastate values of the enterprise." Container, 463 U.S. at 180 (quoting Exxon, 447 U.S. at
220) and that the income apportioned to a state is "out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transacted in that state." Id. (quoting Hans Rees, 283 U.S. 123, 135.)
69. See Mobil, 445 U.S. at 442-446.
70. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. Id. at 279.
72. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 998.
73. Id., at 998 n. 18.
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in the form of section 482 adjustments. 74 It is also used in concluding
foreign tax treaties."' This approach treats transactions occurring be-
tween related foreign and domestic corporations as being performed at
arm's length: "income attributable to the foreign entity is calculated by
reference to a transaction between individual parties.
76
The significance of the divergent practices of federal and state taxing
authorities arises from the power of Congress "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations."'77 Moreover, the Constitution forbids states from making
separate arrangements with foreign governments.7" Suggestions to make
the states conform to federal practice have long been discussed and con-
sidered. 9 Yet Congress has still failed to act on any proposed legislation.
]lased on this lethargy, the Court has been reluctant to prescribe that
states' taxing practices emulate the federal mode. In Mobil, where such
treatment was said to be mandatory, the Court stated, "[a]bsent some
explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign
income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States."80
The Court did not take a definitive stand on the issue until Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles."1 In Japan Line, the Court found
unconstitutional Los Angeles' local property tax on Japanese cargo con-
tainers which had already been taxed in Japan. The Court held that the
commerce clause will not allow a state to "impose a [fairly apportioned,]
non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned instrumen-
talities (cargo containers) of international commerce"8 used exclusively
in furtherance of such commerce. Although it recognized that "interstate
commerce must bear its fair share of the state tax burden, 8 3 the Court
said that multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce
Clause. ' The Court, therefore, identified two more hurdles, in addition to
the requirements of Complete Auto, 8 that must be overcome to validate
74. "Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to the Code make it clear that commonly controlled entities are to be treated as if they
were separate entities for the purpose of determining taxable income from intercompany
transactions." Weissman, supra note 8, at 54. See Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968). The reg-
ulations under section 482 are designed to require that all intercompany transactions be
conducted at arm's length and allow the Internal Revenue Service to intervene by correcting
any understatements of income or other misallocations which do not accurately reflect the
tax conduct of two otherwise uncontrolled taxpayers.
75. For example, the OECD treaty and the model income tax treaty issued in June 1981
reflect a "water's edge" rule. SPEciAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 998.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
79. See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
80. 445 U.S. at 448.
81. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
82. Id. at 435-36.
83. Id. at 444. (quoting Washington Revenue Dept. v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978)).
84. Id. at 446.
85. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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a tax on interstate commerce.8 6 These factors are "the enhanced risk of
multiple taxation" that may result from simultaneous application of state
taxes and taxes imposed by a foreign government,"7 and the possibility
that "a state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."88
Japan Line can be distinguished from earlier cases where multiple
taxation was alleged. For example, in Mobil, the Court noted that "the
factors favoring use of the allocation method in property taxation have no
immediate applicability to an income tax."8 8 Also, Japan Line involved
multiple taxation at the international level, whereas Mobil, which had
conceded the power of the state of its commercial domicile to tax 100% of
its foreign source dividends, was ultimately concerned solely with multi-
ple taxation among the states. 0 While multiple taxation resulting from
different states' taxes might burden foreign commerce, the Court could
ultimately remove the burden, if it so chose, because it has the power to
mandate and restrict state taxing measures. In Japan Line, however, the
Court lacked a similar power since it had no authority to dictate the tax-
ing measures of one of the taxing entities-Japan. The Court, therefore,
lacked the ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing
bodies.8 ' Moreover, actual multiple taxation existed in Japan Line, since
Japan had already taxed the full value of the cargo containers.92 Conse-
quently, any levy on them by a state would result in double taxation.
These factors compelled the Court to deny Los Angeles the power to tax
the Japanese containers at all.
93
The second restriction imposed on unitary taxation by the commerce
clause after Japan Line was that a state tax could not prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial re-
lations with foreign governments." The Court looked at factors other
than the fact that Japan Line involved a foreign taxing entity. Also miti-
86. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 448-51. The Japan Line Court noted some of the problems inherent in the
taxation of entities involved in international commerce:
A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate the
achievement of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State imposes an ap-
portioned tax, international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae
may arise. If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax
structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against
American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions . . . If other
States followed the taxing State's example, various instrumentalities of com-
merce could be subject to varying degrees of multiple taxation.
Id. at 450 (footnote omitted).
89. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 448.
90. Id.
91. Japan Lines, 441 U.S. at 447.
92. Id. at 452 n. 17.
93. Id. at 447-48.
94. Id. at 449.
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gating against implementation of the unitary tax was evidence of federal
government intent in the rationale behind the Customs Convention on
Containers-to remove impediments to the use of containers as instru-
ments of international traffic" 5-to which both Japan and the United
States were signatories.
After adopting additional criteria for determining the validity of a
tax on foreign instrumentalities, the Court again had to consider what
level of risk was appropriate. Two possible tests were available. The
Court rejected the predominant national interest test, which called for
national intervention if the state action fell clearly within the domain of
national interests." Instead, it adopted the serious national harm test
which was much more susceptible to the interests of states' autonomy.
This test requires a showing of serious economic or political harm being
done to the nation by failure of states to harmonize tax practices with the
federal government and foreign governments.
97
In Container, the Court did not articulate further restrictions on
states' authority to tax and thus did not broaden the factors in Japan
Line. Container based its commerce clause claim on the issue of multiple
taxation.9 8 Before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether California
was required to employ the arm's length method of taxation.9 Since the
claim involved international commerce, the two additional requirements
mandated by Japan Line had to be applied.
In considering the first of Japan Line's criteria-that a state's tax
should not increase the risk of multiple taxation, 0 0 the Court distin-
guished property tax in Japan Line and income tax at issue in Container.
The Court conceded the existence of double taxation, but it indicated
that, absent demanding that the state not tax the multinational corpora-
tion at all, it was unable to present a cure. The Court refused to favor
either the separate accounting method or the formula apportionment
method since both result in double taxation."' The Container Court
95. Id. at 453.
96. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 1002.
97. Id.
98. Through its method of separate accounting, Container alleged that during the years
in question, California's apportionment formula attributed an average of four million dollars
more to domestic operations and four million dollars less to Container's foreign subsidies.
Weissman, supra note 8, at 90 (citing Container's Brief). Furthermore, Container claimed
that in one instance the California formula apportioned slightly less to Colombia than the
Colombia subsidiaries paid in Colombian income taxes, while Container's Dutch subsidiary
paid taxes equivalent to 97% of the pretax income attributed to the Netherlands by the
formula. Based on these facts, Container argued that the tax violated the Court's two con-
siderations outlined in Japan Line.
99. Container, 463 U.S. at 163.
100. Id. at 185-6.
101. The Court noted that, although "double taxation is a constitutionally disfavored
state of affairs, particularly in the international context, Japan Line does not require
forebearance so extreme or one-sided [as to force upon the state the separate accounting
methodology]." Id. at 193.
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found no cure for multiple taxation, and refused either to espouse an ab-
solute prohibition against double taxation in the foreign commerce
realm' O2 or to require a state to adopt the arm's length approach.
The Court next considered whether California's tax of Container
would "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential."1 0 3 A state's tax would "violate this so-called 'one-voice' stan-
dard if it either implicates foreign policy issues .. .or violates a clear
federal directive.' 0 4 Noting that the most obvious foreign policy implica-
tion is the threat that a state tax might offend U.S. trading partners and
lead them to retaliate, the Court articulated three factors that prevented
California's tax of Container from having adverse foreign policy
implications.0 5
First, the Court distinguished Japan Line, where the California tax
in question created an automatic asymmetry in international taxation.'06
Second, the Court emphasized that the tax here was imposed on a domes-
tic corporation rather than a foreign enterprise. 0 7 In a footnotes 08 the
Court stated that this factor would be less important in a case where a
domestic corporation was owned by foreign interests. 0 9 Finally, the Court
noted that Container was subject to California tax in one way or another,
and that the amount it paid was more a function of California's tax rate
than of its allocation method." The Court estimated that disfavorable
foreign response to this factor would be at most "attenuated.""'
The Court also concluded that California's tax did not violate a fed-
eral directive, basing its decision primarily on its reading of congressional
intent."2 The Court first noted that federal tax statutes do not preempt
state use of the unitary tax."13 Although tax treaties usually mandate the
use of the arm's length methodology, that requirement is usually waived
by either signatory country in regard to its own domestic corporations.
Moreover, none of the tax treaties have prescribed a specific tax system
for states."" Finally, the Court cited Congress' failure to enact legislation
102. Id. at 189.
103. Id. at 186 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448). Interestingly, the Court voiced
its own feelings of incompetence in trying to delineate foreign policy. Nevertheless, it pro-
ceeded to enumerate criteria for determination of state infringement on federal turf in the
foreign policy context. Id. at 194.
104. Id. at 193-4.
105. Id. at 194.
106. Id. at 194-5 (quoting Japan Line 441 U.S. at 453).
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id. n. 32.
109. See infra discussion of foreign-based multinational corporations.
110. Container, 463 U.S. at 195.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 196.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court also noted that on at least one occasion, Congress has attached a
reservation declining to consent to a provision that would restrict states' authority to use
the apportionment formula. See 124 CONG. REc. 18400, 19076 (1978).
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regulating state taxation.'1 5
IV. THE PREDICAMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS WITH DOMESTIC
SUBSIDIARIES
The Court's decision in Container left open the question of whether
the worldwide unitary method may be applied to tax the worldwide in-
come of a foreign corporation that has a U.S. domestic subsidiary. It has
been predicted that the next case regarding the unitary tax will be such a
case." Westinghouse is currently seeking certiorari, hoping that the
Court will reach the issue of the appropriateness of applying the unitary
tax to domestic subsidiaries of a foreign corporation on its set of facts.1 17
Similarly, Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., a Canadian corporation with a U.S.
subsidiary subject to California's unitary tax, is challenging its imposition
by seeking certiorari after the District Court's dismissal of the action on
the ground that it lacked standing to sue." 8 The Supreme Court refused
to hear Shell Petroleum, N.V.'s appeal, despite the fact that the ten EEC
countries urged the Court to review it."' Nevertheless, Shell illustrates
some of the major problems inherent in a situation where a state seeks to
assess taxes due on a domestic subsidiary whose parent is a foreign mul-
tinational corporation.
Shell Petroleum, N.V. (SPNV), a Netherlands holding company hav-
ing a place of business in the Netherlands, alleged that the California Tax
Board assessed or planned to assess additional taxes under the California
tax apportionment formula on two of its subsidiaries-Shell Oil and Scal-
lop Nuclear. SPNV contended that the Board, in finding a unitary busi-
ness to exist, would combine the income of all the companies worldwide
that are more than fifty percent owned, directly or indirectly, by
SPNV.12 0 Such an application, SPNV alleged, would result in gross dis-
proportion between the income attributed to California activities and the
income actually earned by Shell Oil and Scallop Nuclear in California.' 2 '
As discussed earlier, the earlier Supreme Court cases have continu-
ally held that the taxpayer's accounting system will not impeach the va-
lidity of the taxing formula. This is true even when factors affecting inter-
national commerce and trade relations were found to exist.'22 The
rationale for application of formula apportionment in these situations,
115. Container, 463 U.S. at 196-7.
116. See New Unitary Approach Mulled in Wake of Treasury Decision, 21 TAX NoTEs
69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as New Unitary Approach].
117. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364, 434 N.E.2d. 1044, 449
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1982), prob. juris. noted, 459 U.S. 1144 (1983).
118. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 558 F. Supp. 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
119. Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 570 F. Supp. 58 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
120. Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. Id.
122. See Mobil, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon, 447 U.S. 207; Container, 463 U.S. 159.
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however, is much weaker. The only economic or constitutional justifica-
tion for applying the formula apportionment method is based on the as-
sumption that a dollar spent on sales, property or payroll in one jurisdic-
tion will yield the same result if applied to the same use in another
jurisdiction.'2 3 The assumption rarely holds true when applied to various
states, but it is never true when applied to different nations, whose econo-
mies and societies are far from homogeneous. The costs of property, pay-
roll and sales are usually much lower in foreign countries, 12 4 resulting in a
disproportionate amount of income being attributed to the United States,
and more specifically, the state applying the unitary tax method.1
25
Similar circumstances prompted Alcan to challenge California's im-
position of tax on the unitary business it found to exist.22 Alcan owned a
subsidiary that conducted business in California. Although the subsidiary
operated in the red, the formula attributed income to the California sub-
sidiary since California combined the worldwide income of the Canadian
parent corporation. The truth of the subsidiary's losses was substantiated
by the fact that the Internal Revenue Service had investigated Alcan sev-
eral times during the years in which California sought to assess taxes
(1972-81), and it determined that section 482 adjustments'2 7 were neces-
sary. That Alcan shut down its California operations further shows the
truth of the subsidiary's unprofitability. 28 Foreign trading partners are
understandably aggravated at the prospect of paying taxes on a business
that is already losing money, merely because of its location within a uni-
tary tax state, and threats of relocation and retaliation have followed. 29
The foreign multinational corporation will not be able to protect its
rights adequately when state taxing authorities impose a tax on its world-
wide income simply because the corporation's subsidiary is located within
a unitary tax state. Although the domestic subsidiary will be able to bring
123. See generally, Smith, supra note 5.
124. Sony Corporation attested to this fact before the task force. See infra notes 149-
159 and accompanying text. According to Sony, a disproportionate amount of income is
attributed to the United States under the apportionment method because the costs of prop-
erty, payroll, and sales are higher. Sony cited its specific problem to be the discrepancy in
efficiency between its Japanese and Californian television manufacturing operations: even
though its Japanese operations are more efficient, part of the income generated by the oper-
ation is attributed to California because the costs in California are higher. Most of the com-
plaints lodged at the Nov. 16 task force hearing concerned the distortions of income in favor
of the taxing state resulting from application of worldwide formula apportionment. Shep-
pard, Unitary Group's Task Force Begins to Assess Proof of Harm, 21 TAX NOTES 821
(1983).
125. Weissman, supra note 8, at 56. Another factor that will contribute to the distor-
tion in income attributed to a jurisdiction is if the activities of two components of a unitary
business are not matched; i.e., one is labor intensive while another is capital intensive. Also,
fair attribution may be difficult due to fluctuating exchange rates.
126. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 539 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
127. See supra note 74.
128. Alcan, 539 F. Supp. at 513-14.
129. See generally Smith, supra note 5.
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suit in the state court to protest the imposition of a tax that has already
been paid, that subsidiary cannot invoke a tax treaty between the U.S.
and the country in whose territory its parent corporation is domiciled.
This is true even though the spirit of the treaty is clearly violated. Simi-
larly, the foreign parent will not be allowed to bring suit in the federal
courts because it lacks standing. The parent can invoke the treaty rights;
however, they are likely to be held inapplicable since the tax at issue was
levied on the subsidiary-not the parent, and for matters of standing, the
presence of "unitary business" will not be considered. 30
V. CONGRESSIONAL/EXECUTIVE RESPONSE
As the phenomenon of unitary tax has burgeoned into an omnipres-
ent onus on corporations, and the problems accompanying the method
have become more and more visible, Congress has offered little solace.'
Although Congress has been called upon to allay the difficulties, its re-
sponse thus far has yielded only narrow legislation that falls far short of
an adequate remedy.132 On other occasions, Congress has feigned interest,
evidenced by bills and hearings that, in the end, have yielded no legisla-
130. See Smith, supra note 5; see generally Shell 570 F. Supp. 58.
131. Congress did not exercise its commerce power to legislate in the state tax area
until 1959. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 131. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1964, ch. 106, § 41, 13
Stat. 111 (codified as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
In 1959, Congress for the first time passed legislation limiting the power of the states to
tax interstate commerce. See Act of Sept. 19, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)). This was a specific response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Northwestern State Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Northwest-
ern held that a state could constitutionally impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned
net income tax upon a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the
taxing state. A mere seven months after Northwestern, Congress enacted legislation estab-
lishing a minimum threshold of intrastate activities that must be exceeded by a foreign
corporation in a state before that state may subject such a corporation to a tax measured by
net income. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
One of the other pieces of federal legislation limiting state tax authority under Con-
gress' commerce powers was likewise a direct reaction to a Supreme Court decision. In Ev-
ansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), the
Court upheld enplaning charges as reasonable amounts charged to defray the costs of build-
ing or maintaining airport facilities used by the passengers. Congress responded by prohibit-
ing the states from imposing user charges in connection with carriage of persons in air com-
merce. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976).
132. Some legislation has surfaced, though its scope is limited. Hellerstein, supra note
1, at 113 nn. 3 & 4. See 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing electrical
energy taxes discriminatorily against out-of-state purchasers); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976)
(prohibiting states from imposing stock transfer taxes when only nexus between the state
and the transaction is the presence of a transfer agency); 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976) (prohibit-
ing states from imposing user charges in connection with the carriage of persons in air com-
merce); 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1978) (prohibiting states from taxing railroad property more
heavily than other industrial and commercial property); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 92-296 § 3, 94 Stat. 793 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503a) (prohibiting states from
taxing motor carrier property more heavily than other industrial and commercial property).
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tion. 33 In recent opinions, 34 the Supreme Court has invited Congress, if
it is dissatisfied with the Court's laissez-faire approach, to enact meaning-
ful legislation. 3 ' Bills have been introduced in Congress which propose to
prohibit the states from using the worldwide unitary method,3 6 but no
hearings have yet been scheduled. 37
A major problem with the proposed legislation is that, without clarifi-
cation of the Administration's stance, it is doubtful whether the legisla-
tion can muster enough support.' The Executive Branch, which rarely
involves itself in the area of state taxation, has been conspicuously active
concerning the topic of unitary tax,3 9 though its signals have been ambiv-
alent and increasingly phlegmatic. The Administration filed an amicus
curiae brief supporting the anti-unitary tax position in Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.;" however, its failure to file one in
Container despite urgings from corporate interests and foreign govern-
ments" might have been critical."" After the Container case had been
decided, foreign representatives again approached the administration,
urging that it file for Supreme Court rehearing of the case." 3 Great Brit-
133. Chairman's Report on the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group Activi-
ties, Issues, and Recommendations, 24 TAx NoTEs 581 (1984)(hereinafter cited as Chair-
man's Report); Additional Views of Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group Mem-
bers, 25 TAx NoTEs 1043 (1984). See infra note 151.
134. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1978); Washington Revenue,
435 U.S. 734, 749 (1978).
135. The Court's decisions, however, have given states substantial leeway. See Moor-
man, 437 U.S. 267; Washington Revenue, 435 U.S. 734; National Geo. Soc'y v. State Bd. of
Equilization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274; Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
136. Bernick, Cabinet Council Recommends Anti-Unitary Position, 20 TAx NOTEs 901
(1983).
137. Id.
138. Id. Bob Ragland, Director of Taxation at the National Ass'n of Manufacturers,
said that, without support from the Administration, supporters of anti-unitary tax legisla-
tion "aren't going to go out on a limb" for the legislation. New Unitary Approach, supra
note 116, at 69.
139. See, e.g., Japan Line (U.S. filed a brief and argued as amicus curiae); House For-
eign Source Income Hearings on H.R. 5076 at 38-55 (statement of Hon. Doland C. Lubick,
Asst. Sec. of Treas. for Tax Policy); Tax Treaties with the United Kingdom, the Republic
of Korea, and the Republic of the Phillipines: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. of For-
eign Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Sess., 13-40 (1977) (statement of Hon. Laurence N.
Woolworth, Asst. Sec'y of Treas. for Tax Policy) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Tax
Treaties].
140. Appeal dismissed, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
141. New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69.
142. The Supreme Court did not find the failure to file a brief dispositive of the Ad-
ministration's view, but concluded nonetheless that, in the Administration's view, federal
interests were "not seriously threatened by California's decision to apply the unitary busi-
ness concept and formula apportionment." Container, 463 U.S. at 196.
143. Administration Seeks Unitary Method Compromise, 20 TAX Noras 1026 (1983).
See, e.g., Letter from Marc Lalonde, Canadian Minister of Finance, to Donald T. Regan,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasure, (Aug. 8, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAx NoTEs 684 (1983). Letter
from Nigel Lawson, United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer, to U.S. Treasury Don-
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ain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was especially vocal. 1 4  More-
over, after a meeting of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, top
Reagan Administration officials recommended to President Reagan that
the Administration oppose the worldwide unitary tax. 145 Reagan instead
referred the issue back to the Cabinet Council,'4 6 an action that was seen
as a stalling tactic.1"7
At the same time as President Reagan announced his intent not to
file a petition for rehearing of the Container case, the Administration an-
nounced the creation of a working group 14 8 to study the international ap-
plication of worldwide unitary taxation.149 The working group held its
first meeting in November, 1983.150 Composed of representatives of the
federal government, state governments, and the U.S. business commu-
nity, 1 5 1 the group was assembled to consider: the definition of a unitary
aid T. Regan, (July 12, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAX NoTEs 450 (1983). Letter from James Q.
Riordan, Senior Vice President of Mobil Corporation, to Donald T. Regan, U.S. Treasury
Secretary, (Aug. 9, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAX NoTs 692 (1983). Representatives of the
states' interests, while pleased that the administration failed to file an amicus curiae brief
or to petition the court for rehearing in Container, were still not entirely satisfied. For ex-
ample, James Rosapepe of the Multistate Tax Commission, indicated that the Administra-
tion's action "fell short of the pro-unitary position that the states were urging the Adminis-
tration to adopt." New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69.
144. See, e.g., Shears, Reagan Snubs Thatcher's Efforts to Halt U.S. Unitary Taxes,
The Daily Telegraph, Sept. 24, 1983, at 6.
145. Bernick, supra note 136, at 901.
146. Bernick, Reagan Sends Back Cabinet Recommendation on Unitary Tax, 20 TAX
NOTES 965 (1983).
147. Id.
148. Id. This act, too, can be viewed as foot dragging. The creation of a working group
was the least decisive of four options suggested and presented to the Cabinet Council by a
Treasury Department option paper. The other options presented were as follows: First, it
described the Conable-Mathias position, now contained in S. 1225 (H.R. 2196) that the
states not be permitted to use the unitary method. Another option ... was that it do noth-
ing on the ground that no federal question is involved. A third option . . . was that the
application of the unitary method be limited in the case of foreign corporations with U.S.
subsidiaries. Sheppard, Chapoton Labels Unitary Tax Method an Irritant in International
Relations, 21 TAX NoTEs 439 (1983).
149. Reagan announced that the purpose of the working group was to study the unitary
issue and to develop a federal policy on the unitary method that is "conducive to harmoni-
ous international economic relations, while also respecting the fiscal rights and privileges of
individual states." New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69. (citing press release of
Donald T. Regan, Sept. 23, 1983).
150. Sheppard, Unitary Method Group Tries to Define Problem, 21 TAX NoTEs 525
(1983).
151. The members of the Working Group, who were chosen by the Administration, are:
Phillip Caldwell, Ford Motor Co. & Business Roundtable
Owen L. Clarke, National Ass'n of Tax Administrators
Kent Conrad, Multistate Tax Commission
Gov. George Deukmejian, California
Clifton C. Garvin, Exxon Corp.
Robert E. Gilmore, Caterpillar Tractor Co.
Gov. Scott Matheson, Utah
Charles I. McCarty, BATUS, Inc.
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business; application of the three-factor (payroll, sales, and property) ap-
portionment formula in the international context; uniform rate setting
and information sharing among the states; the desirability of federal leg-
islation; and the possibility of information sharing between federal and
state governments. 152 Each member of the working group in turn selected
a representative to serve on the task force, whose purpose was to provide
technical expertise in implementing the policies decided on by the work-
ing group.' 53
Representatives of states' interests have been particularly obstinate.
They have refused to consider any options until some national harm has
been demonstrated, 5 " and have threatened to boycott if the alternative of
federal legislation was not withdrawn. 155 They became a bit more amiable
when it was pointed out that their very presence in the work group indi-
cated that the Reagan Administration considered use by the states of the
unitary tax harmful to national interests.5' The states' representatives
have also pushed for "full accountability," alleging that double taxation
was rarely at issue, but that, instead, corporations had income on which
they paid no tax.157 Assuming that corporations do have income that is
not required to be reported anywhere, the states would require that all
income be reported somewhere, or a legitimate excuse be given for not
reporting. 58 Although this approach seems more than slightly avaricious,
Peter McGowan, Safeway Stores
Lee Moffitt, Florida
David E. Nething, National Conf. of State Legislatures
John R. Opel, International Business Machines
Norma Pace, American Paper Institute
Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Pfizer, Inc.
Gov. James R. Thompson, Illinois
John B. Tucker, New Hampshire
Administration representatives included:
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy
Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Analysis, Staff Director
John A. Svahn, Assistant to the President for Policy Development
W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
152. Sheppard, supra note 148, at 439.
153. Sheppard, supra note 150.
154. Sheppard, supra note 124, at 821.
155. Sheppard, Federal Legislation Haunts Unitary Method Working Group, 21 TAX
NOTES 1011 (1983).
156. Sheppard, supra note 124, at 821. At the same time, Administration officials pro-
duced letters from eight countries evidencing dissatisfaction with the use of the unitary
method. Among those countries were Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. More-
over, it was assumed that other countries, such as Great Britain, were seeking to redress
their grievances through the State Department.
157. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 525-26; Sheppard, Unitary Task Force Seeks to De-
fine Full Accountability, 21 TAX NOTES 132 (1983).
158. Sheppard, supra note 157, at 132.
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"full accountability" has been adopted as a goal of both the task force
and the working group. States have said that they will consider an alter-
native to formula apportionment only if they are convinced that business
investment and jobs are at stake, and they can be sure that they will lose
no revenue. 59 Given the obstinance of the states and the equally firm
positions of corporate interests, it is not surprising that the group's study
has resulted in less than revolutionary findings and resolutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
For several reasons, states support the unitary tax method over the
separate accounting method, the only apparent alternative.' The pri-
mary interest states have in the unitary method is the revenue its imple-
mentation generates. States also complain that the use of the separate
accounting method would create serious administrative problems. States
also argue from the vantage point of fairness, positing that they will be
unable to accurately assess the tax liability of an enterprise if formal ap-
portionment is disallowed. Tax burdens will be shifted inequitably to
smaller businesses if the multinationals are allowed to avoid their tax
burden. Proponents of the unitary method argue that concepts of state
sovereignty require that they be allowed to employ formula apportion-
ment and cite self-correcting forces, such as judicial supervision and state
competition, as sufficient to prevent the occurrence of national harm.
The difficulties created by the use of separate accounting, however,
are far less burdensome than those created by the use of the unitary
method. Either method engenders administrative problems, but the bur-
den seems much more appropriately placed on states, who can retrieve
tax information from the federal tax authorities'' than to burden corpo-
rations with massive paperwork with which they might be unable to
comply.
Use of the unitary method in the international arena may have seri-
ous ramifications. Discontented trading partners may choose to trade
with other countries rather than risk imposition of tax on the worldwide
income of their own multinationals. The lack of tax harmonization may
lead other countries to retaliate against United States interests operating
in their territory and may lead to serious impairment of trade relations,
including the inability to conclude tax treaties.'6 2
159. Sheppard, supra note 157.
160. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 525.
161. At least some of the information necessary to assess tax liability under the sepa-
rate accounting method is already given to the states, since most states' laws require that
the federal government report to the states when making a § 482 adjustment. Sheppard,
supra note 124, at 822.
162. The United States is party to at least 30 tax treaties. In testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Laurence Woodworth, the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, reported:
We view tax treaties as an important element in the international economic
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The problems arising out of states' use of formula apportionment
demonstrate that, in the international arena, the unitary method should
not be used. Each argument advanced by proponents of the unitary
method is met by a problem that rises to the level of national harm and
cannot be easily resolved. Unfortunately, a resolution does not seem
forthcoming, since both the Judiciary and the Legislature await some def-
inite signal from the Executive. The Executive Branch should abandon its
stance of ambiguity and lethargy in favor of an affirmative position for
international trade, for ultimately, the condition of relations with our for-
eign trading partners will affect the nation and the individual states much
more than any problems proponents of the unitary tax can advance.
policy of the United States. One of our fundamental objectives is to minimize
impediments to free international flows of capital and technology and this ob-
jective is fostered by having the broadest possible network of income treaties.
Among the major impediments to free capital and technology flows are the
rules of national tax systems and their interaction with the systems of other
countries. Tax treaties seek to eliminate, or at least mitigate the impact of
these impediments.
Treaties accomplish the minimization of impediments by a variety of
means, the principal ones being the elimination or reduction of double taxation
and the elimination, to the extent possible, of discriminatory tax rules which
distinguish unreasonably between domestic and foreign investment.
At the same time, tax treaties also serve other policy objectives-for exam-
ple, the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion, and the fostering of interna-
tional cooperation between the tax authorities of Contracting States.
Hearings on Tax Treaties, supra note 139, at 28 (Statement of Asst. Sec. of the Treas.,
Laurence Woodworth).
Chapoton, in a speech before the National Association of State Bar Tax Sections, in
Washington, D.C., on Oct. 21, 1983, cited one instance of a country's refusal to continue tax
treaty negotiation based on disapprobation of the unitary tax method. Sheppard, supra note
148, at 439.
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